

Institute for Transport Economics and Transport Policy Studies Together with Vysokovsky Graduate School of Urbanism

Faculty of Urban and Regional Development
National Research University Higher School of Economics

# MARKET INITIATIVE AND CENTRAL PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF BUS NETWORK IN MOSCOW

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### MARKET INITIATIVE AND CENTRAL PLANNING

#### Points of the debate

- Central planning is a mainstream way for achieving integration and coordination. But limitations in demand development.
- Market initiative have a poor reputation for wasteful competition and poor coordination. But demand responsiveness.
- Intermediate regimes: Netherlands with area-based contracting with incentives.
- Hybrid regimes: formal and informal, public and private, planned and self-regulated, etc.
- 'Big bang' reforms in developing countries (e.g., Transantiago).

Still few studies on hybrid regimes and the influence of different regimes on network structure.



#### STUDY AREA

Moscow (inner city)


The capital and the largest city of Russia

More than 12 million people

15 metro lines, 9 railway lines, ~ 1000 land transport routes

State operator (Mosgortrans): 70% of bus and 100% of tram, trolleybus and electric bus market

Private operators serve the remaining 30% of the bus market





## PUBLIC TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE IN MOSCOW

#### A brief history

N	Time period	Organisational form	Description
1	Before 1991	State monopoly	All services by public operator
2	1991 - 1998	Hybrid: state operator plus free market	Basic services by public operator; additional services by private operators who enter the market freely and provide services without special regulation
3	1998 - 2006	Hybrid: state operator plus route registration	Basic services by public operator; additional services by private operators who propose routes and achieve permits after the approval of authorities
4	2006 - 2016	Hybrid: state operator plus route franchising	Basic services by public operator; additional services by private operators who propose routes and achieve 5-year permits if authorities approve the route and if operators make best quality bid in competitive tender. No formal preference to the proposer of the route.
5	After 2016	Hybrid: state operator plus gross cost contracting	Basic services by public operator; additional services by private operators who work under competitive gross cost contracts for predefined routes and services

## THE NEW MODEL OF 2016

Service improvements

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## The new model The old model ПАССАЖИРСКИЙ ТРАНСПОРТ СТАРАЯ МОДЕЛЬ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ПАССАЖИРСКИМИ ПЕРЕВОЗКАМИ НОВАЯ МОДЕЛЬ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ПАССАЖИРСКИМИ ПЕРЕВОЗКАМИ стандарту Евро-5 ПАССАЖИРСКИЙ ТРАНСПОРТ

## NETWORK CHANGES IN MOSCOW IN 2016

#### Key indicators

	Criterion	2015	2016	2019	
1	Routes				
	Bus (private)	461	207 (-55%)	221	
	Bus (Mosgortrans)	607	545	575	
	Trolleybus (Mosgortrans)	99	95	48	
	Tram (Mosgortrans)	49	51	51	
2	Network length				
	Bus (private)	7078 km	3527 km (-50%)	3839 km	
	Bus (Mosgortrans)	11258 km	10405 km	11449 km	
	Trolleybus (Mosgortrans)	2041 km	1963 km	979 km	
	Tramway (Mosgortrans)	952 km	987 km	1044 km	
3	Fleet size (number of daily circulating units)				
	Bus (private)	3771	1665 (-56%)	1784	
	Bus (Mosgortrans)	4681	3786	4582	
	Trolleybus (Mosgortrans)	1283	1226	627	
	Tram (Mosgortrans)	774	622	580	



## RESEARCH QUESTIONS


Q1. Were the changes aimed at rationalising the private network by eliminating parallel routes while saving (or increasing) the network coverage and capacity?

Q2. Whether the changes have divided operating areas between Mosgortrans and private operators, or not?




## NETWORK CHANGES IN MOSCOW IN 2016

#### Private operators (minibus)



#### State operator (bus, trolleybus and tram)





#### RESEARCH METHOD

Hexagon mosaic maps (geographical method)


Why: Established geographical method to analyse spatial data.


Allows to use point, line or polygon based data.


Why hexagons (not triangles or rectangles):

Visual appeal and representational accuracy (see, Carr et al., 1992, p. 229).


Input: Linear data with routes (with attributes).









#### Number of routes (private)




#### Capacity (private)




#### Number of routes (public)



#### Capacity (public)



#### Market share (private / public)





## CONCLUSIONS

#### Private operators:

The initial network was developed more evenly than usually thought (not only along the most lucrative corridors).

The overall network changes were far greater than the pure 'rationalisation'.

The complexity, coverage, and frequency of the private operators' network were significantly deteriorated.

The capacity of the private operators' network was redistributed (decreased, but not evenly).

#### Market shares:

The market shares of public and private operators have remained stable, but changed in some areas.



### DISCUSSION

Whether the reductions were aimed at coping with excess capacity, or to reduce the competition with public operator?

Should the hybrid networks be structured spatially?

Can the switch from market initiative to central planning be done 'ideally'?

#### Some comments to this study:

- The hexagon based framework works well.
- Further use of statistical methods is needed to make the study robust.
- Other data (housing, schools, hospitals, metro and rail stations, depots location) can be added to the study to understand how different institutional regimes change the coverage of these objects by public transport.
- Recent data (2019) may be included to show the changes to the network after 2016. Question: what had planners learned?



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